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Protest Bidders in
Contingent Valuation
John M. Halstead, A.E. Luloff, and Thomas H. Stevens
Protest bids are often excluded during analysis of contingent valuation method data. It is
suggested that this procedure might introduce significant bias. Protest bids are often registered
by respondents who may actually place a higher- or lower-than-average value on the
commodity in question but refuse to pay on the basis of ethical or other reasons, Exclusion of
protest bids may therefore bias willingness to pay (WTP) results, but the direction of bias is
indeterminate a priori.
The contingent valuation method (CVM) of esti-
mating values for nonmarket goods has gained
widespread acceptance in the economics commu-
nity. Mitchell and Carson (1989, p. 2), for exam-
ple, state that “as things now stand, contingent
valuation represents the most promising approach
yet developed for determining the public’s willing-
ness to pay for public goods. ” Yet, critics and
proponents alike are constantly questioning the va-
lidity of the CVM.
This article examines the problem of protest
bids. Several types of protest to the CVM may
occur. Individuals who object to the survey may
simply not respond; some may give positive, but
invalid bids (outliers); while others may state a
zero value for a good that they actually value (pro-
test zero bids). There are several possible reasons
for this behavio~ some respondents may feel that it
is unethical to place a monetary value on public
goods such as wildlife or environmental quality,
while others may argue that these goods should be
provided “free of charge. ” The central focus of
this article is to determine whether respondents
who give protest zero bids differ from other bid-
ders and what the consequences of these potential
differences might be. The likely consequences of
previously used approaches to account for protest
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zero bids are examined, and an attempt is made to
determine which is the most appropriate.
The first section discusses the problem of bias
caused by protest bids in CVM and explores the
treatment of protest bids in empirical studies. The
second section uses discriminant analysis of a
study of wildlife values in New England to deter-
mine whether protest zero bidders can be effec-
tively characterized by sociodemographic factors.
Implications of various methods of treating protest
zero bidders are then examined, and conclusions
are drawn about the bias that might be introduced
and how this bias might be mitigated.
Protest Bids and Bias in Contingent Valuation
The Nature of Protest Bids
Deviations of stated willingness to pay from
“true” values may be caused by a number of fac-
tors. These biases can be grouped into three broad
categories: (1) biases caused by or in response to
the survey instrument itself, such as strategic bias,
starting-point bias, or scenario misspecification
(Mitchell and Carson; Cummings, Brookshire, and
Schulze); (2) biases caused by nonresponse (either
in whole or in part) to the survey, usually termed
‘‘nonresponse” bias (Dalecki, Ilvento, and Moore;
Shultz and Luloff); and (3) “protest” bias.
Protest bias occurs whenever individuals who
oppose or do not approve of the survey fail to
respond, give invalid but positive bids (outliers]),
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or place a zero value on a good that they actually
value. The problem of protest zero bids is of par-
ticular concern in dichotomous-choice contingent
valuation, since a “no” response may be misin-
terpreted as willingness to pay less than the stated
amount, rather than as a protest.
Protest zero bids are quite common in contin-
gent valuation. For example, Reiling et al. (1989)
classified 11?40 of nonzero sample responses and
24% of zero bids in their study of black fly control
as probable protest bids, while Desvousges,
Smith, and McGivney identified nearly half of the
zero bids in their study of water quality as protest
zero bids. Rowe and Chestnut cite several studies
with protest zero bid rates of 5070 or higher. In a
study of actual contributors and noncontributory to
the Virginia nongame wildlife checkoff program,
Ferguson found that nearly 27% of noncontributory
who were aware of the checkoff program did not
contribute due to protest reasons. As Nash (p. 680)
notes, these “blanks and ‘no answers’ cannot be
easily incorporated or dismissed. ”
Identification of Protest Bids
All bids must be scrutinized for invalid responses.
One procedure for identifying positive, but inva-
lid, protest bids involves iterative elimination of
observations from the data set and recalculation of
regression coefficients (Desvousges, Smith, and
Fisher; Reiling et al. 1989). An observation is usu-
ally classified as an outlier if it results in a 30910 or
more change in the estimated value of the income
coefficient. 2
All zero bids also must be carefully examined
and classified as either legitimate zero bids or pro-
test bids (Freeman). Preferably, protest zero bids
could be identified through personal interviews;
however, given the expense of personal inter-
views, many willingness to pay (WTP) surveys are
now conducted by mail, which precludes this as a
possibility. Protest zero bids are usually identified
by follow-up questions that examine the respon-
dents’ motivation for providing zero bids. Reasons
often cited for zero bids include disagreement with
or distaste for the vehicle of payment used in the
survey instmment, ethical reasons, or the belief
that the good should be provided by means other
than personal payments (Freeman; Mitchell and
Carson; Sagoff).
Several studies have attempted to examine the
factom that motivate protest bidders. Smith and
Desvousges constructed a probit model to explore
the determinants of nonzero bids in their study of
risk-reducing behavior regarding hazardous wastes
in Acton, Massachusetts. Their results indicated
that the probability of a zero bid decreased with
education and risk of exposure, and increased with
greater knowledge of the issue. Musser, Wadding-
ton, and Shortle used a logit model to examine
determinants of protest zero bids in their study of
farmland preservation in Pennsylvania. The au-
thors found that respondents with higher education
levels, age, and income were less likely to register
protest zero bids. In addition, beliefs by the re-
spondent that development was “good,” preser-
vation of farmland was not necessary, and.that it
was important to preserve open space all decreased
the probability of a protest zero bid.3
Treatment of Protest Zero Bids in
Empirical Studies
Because protest zero bids can represent a high per-
centage of total survey respondents, some efforts
have been made to avoid this problem through
careful survey design (Sutherland and Walsh;
Walsh, Loomis, and Gillman). However, it is not
always possible to eliminate all protest bids.
Sagoff (p. 62) interprets protest zero bids as simple
“refusals to sell”; if this is indeed the case, it
would be difficult to reduce the number of protests
through improved survey design.
Traditionally, there have been three principal
means of dealing with protest zero bids: (1) drop
them from the data set; (2) treat the protest bids as
legitimate zero bids and include them in the data
set; or (3) assign protest bidders mean WTP values
based upon their sociodemographic characteristics
relative to the rest of the sample group. This last
approach uses econometric techniques similar to
those employed to account for missing data in re-
gression analysis (Haitovsky). The treatment of
protest bids becomes especially important when
the benefit aggregation issue is considered; the de-
cision to include protest zero bids in the data can
have a significant effect on aggregate value esti-
mates.
Protest zero bids are often simply identified and
eliminated from the data set (Freeman; Johnson,
tionz--reprasent from 5% to 10% of total sample bids (Mitchell and
Carson).
2 Income is used because it is common to most theoretical constructs
of the CVM.
3It shouldbe notedthat while SmithandDesvousges includedall zero
bids (protest and nonprotest) in their pmbit nmdysis, Musser et al. di-
rected their attention specifically at protest zem bids.162 October 1992 NJARE
Bregenzer, and Shelby; Mitchell and Carson). This
technique reduces the downward bias caused by
including protest zero bids. Unfortunately, a major
side effect of this approach is the concomitant loss
of potentially useful information with the possible
introduction of self-selection bias. This procedure
essentially assumes that protest bidders have a
mean WTP which is equal to that of sample non-
respondents. However, previous studies indicate
that survey nonresponse may be caused by lack of
interest in the survey topic (Dillman; Stephens and
Hall), while protest bids may be motivated by ex-
treme interest in the subject matter. Freeman noted
that many nonrespondents are poorly educated and
have low incomes, while Liu and Smith found that
the probability of nonresponse in a study of risk
perception in Taiwan increased with education and
income. Regardless, doubt is cast on the practice
of treating protest bidders in the same fashion as
nonrespondents.
A second technique is to assign mean sample
values to protest zero bidders or to assign adjusted
values based on analysis of sociodemographic
characteristics. If the protest zero bidders’ socio-
demographic characteristics are similar to those of
the general population, there may be a basis for
extrapolating mean sample WTP to the population
as a whole, as done by Walsh, Loomis, and Gill-
man. Loomis (1987b) advocates a method of
weighted least squares to derive aggregate benefits
for the population (including nonrespondents).
However, protest zero bidders may be very differ-
ent from nonrespondents. Such treatment does not
in itself obviate the concern for bias.
A third approach simply includes protest bids in
the data set on the basis that these bids are legiti-
mate zero valuations. McGuirk, Stephenson, and
Taylor (pp. 1–2) have argued that protest bids
“should be considered legitimate WTP bids as re-
spondents are essentially valuing a proposed pol-
icy, not just a commodity, ” Randall notes that
WTP estimates are based not only on the value of
the commodity being offered, but also on the
means by which the public good will be provided
and the method of payment for the good, so that
the strict valuation of the good cannot be separated
from the public policy issues associated with its
provision. Following this line of argument, a pro-
test bid may occur when distaste for the means of
provision or payment offsets personal valuation of
the good. However, if a CVM survey is primarily
concerned with obtaining a value for the good in
question and/or the survey instrument reflects an
attempt to realistically frame a contingent market
rather than to evaluate a potential policy option,
this argument may not hold. In such a case, protest
bids are not legitimate zero bids.
Profile of Protest Bidders in CVM
The preceding section has described the typical
procedure for the treatment of protest bids—they
are usually dropped from the analysis. If protest
bidders are the “same” as other respondents, this
may be a valid procedure. However, potential
problems arise if protest bidders differ substan-
tially from other respondents. Therefore, it is im-
portant to test for differences between protest bid-
ders and other survey respondents. This study used
discriminant analysis to examine survey responses
to a study of wildlife valuation in New England to
determine whether protest zero bidders and other
respondents can be classified according to key in-
dividual traits that are generally recognized as hav-
ing significant impacts on respondents’ WTP.
The Case Study
A CVM survey about the value of bald eagles,
coyotes, and wild turkeys in New England was
mailed to 1,500 randomly selected households in
the spring of 1989. The survey included general
questions about outdoor activities and the impor-
tance of wildlife, valuation questions, and several
follow-up questions to identify protest bids and to
examine the consistency of the results obtained
from the valuation questions. The total design
method suggested by Dillman was followed
throughout.
A modified dichotomous-choice economic val-
uation question confronted each individual with a
specified amount of money, N, (randomly selected
within fixed intervals over a range of $5 to $150),
which she/he could contribute for wildlife preser-
vation and/or management, The sample was parti-
tioned into five groups, each of which received an
identical questionnaire except for the valuation
question. The first group received a valuation
question about bald eagles, the second group was
asked about coyote control, the third was asked
about wild turkeys and bald eagles combined, the
fourth focused on coyote preservation, and the fi-
nal group was asked to value wild turkeys. For
example, the bald eagle valuation question was
specified as follows:
Habitat protection and management efforts
sponsored in part by state, local, and federal
governments have helped to return some wild-Halstead, Luloff, and Stevens Protest Bidders in Contingent Valuation 163
life species from the brink of extinction. The
bald ~agle and the wild turkey, for example,
have both been brought back to New England.
Suppose that budget cuts eliminate these pro-
grams and that a private trust fund for the man-
agement of the BALD EAGLE is set up to pre-
serve and protect the BALD EAGLE population
in New England (assume that the BALD EAGLE
will not continue to exist in New England unless
this is created). Would you contribute $N per
year over the next five years to this fund?
If respondents answered “no” to the valuation
question, they were confronted with a choice of
one of the following series of statements:
a. The amount is too much; I would donate
$_ per year over the next five years (please
write in the maximum dollar amount that you
would contribute).
b. The bald eagle should be preserved in New
England but the money should come from taxes
and license fees (from game species) instead of
donations.
c. The bald eagle is not worth anything to me.
d. Bald eagle preservation is important to me
but I refuse to place a dollar value on it.
e. Other, please explain.
Respondents were also given an opportunity to
bid an amount greater than the stated value, N.
Responses could therefore be treated as derived
from either an open-ended or dichotomous-choice
format.
The survey response rate was 37.5%, which is
somewhat below average for academic surveys of
the general population (Loomis; Mitchell and Car-
son).4 The extent to which nonresponse was mo-
tivated by protest is not known. However, this
CVM involves choice between income and moral
principle (existence of wildlife), which, as noted
by Opaluch and Segerson, maybe a factor associ-
ated with several abnmmalities, including high
nonresponse rate.
Average bids and equivalent surplus estimates
for all species combined are presented later in the
paper in Table 5, along with relevant information
on functional form. Separate estimates for each
species and details of the estimation procedure are
given in Stevens et al. Although these value esti-
mates appear consistent with previous studies (see,
for example, Bowker and Stoll), the majority of
4 However, a survey of response rates of 16 recent CVM stud!es
reveafedthat 9 had response rates of 45% or less (Mitchell and Carson,
p. 281).
respondents were not willing to pay any money for
wildlife, even though most said that bald eagles,
coyotes, and wild turkeys are either somewhat or
very important to them. This suggests that many
respondents may have protested this CVM. All
bids (n = 305) were therefore analyzed for outliers
and for protest zero bids. No outliers were de-
tected, but about one-half of all zero bids appeared
to be protest zero bids.
Sixty-eight percent (207) of all respondents en-
tered zero bids. Responses (b) and (d) (accounting
for 98 responses) were classified as protest re-
sponses. Response (b) was classified as a protest
against the methods of payment and accounted for
63% of protest bids; (d) was considered a protest
for ethical reasons and accounted for the remaining
37% of this group. Since these protesters did not
choose (c) or (e), the implication is that they do, in
fact, value the resource.
Although this type of approach has frequently
been used to identify protest zero bids (see Reiling
et al. 1989; Desvousges, Smith, and McGivney),
there are a number of potential problems. First, the
question asking respondents about motivations un-
derlying zero bids included a series of fixed-
response categories. Previous research suggests
that respondents “construct” preferences during
the process of elicitation and that information con-
veyed to respondents influences results. Both of
these issues raise questions about the extent to
which respondents might be prompted or led by
placement and wording of fixed-response catego-
ries (see Tversky and Thaleu Samples, Dixon, and
Gowen). Also, some respondents might have se-
lected (b) or (d) simply because they seemed most
palatable. Although this is a concern, the majority
of respondents bidding zero in this CVM did not
select (b) or (d); the open-ended category, (e), was
selected by 42910of all zero bidders and category
(c) was chosen by 10%. Results obtained from
fixed-response categories must be carefully inter-
preted, however. 5
Discriminant Analysis to Classlfy Protest and
Nonprotest Bidders
Discriminant analysis is a multivariate statistical
technique that allows the researcher to ascertain
differences between two or more groups with re-
SOne reviewer suggests that protest zero bids should be identified
through in-persondiscussion with respondents conducted by a 4‘discus-
sion facilitator.” While thk approachwould yield much valuable infor-
mation, it would likely be prohbkively expensive and could contribute
to wide variation in interpretation.164 October 1992
spect to several independent variables simulta-
neously (Klecka; Kachigan). The discrete depen-
dent variable is defined by the number of groups,
while the endogenous factors define the multidi-
mensional space between these groups. This linear
combination of independent variables, called the
discriminant function, maximizes between-group
variations while minimizing within-group varia-
tions.
Logit analysis could have been chosen to exam-
ine the protest bid issue. However, we felt that
discriminant analysis was more appropriate since,
in this preliminary analysis, the main interest was
on differentiating between the two groups (protest
and non-protest), rather than addressing variations
in probability caused by changes in independent
variables (the strength of the logit technique), 6
Variables Included in the Discriminant Analysis
Previous research efforts on factors influencing
WTP for nonmarket goods have identified a num-
ber of common variables: education, income,
membership in environmental and sportsmen’s or-
ganizations, age, gender, residence, occupation,
outdoor activities, and attitudes about the good in
question (see, for example, Walsh, Loomis, and
Gillman; Reiling et al.; Sutherland and Walsh).
Since these variables have been identified as prime
determinants of WTP values, they were used to
characterize the profiles drawn by the discriminant
analysis; if these truly are the “important” vari-
ables influencing WTP, then variances between
protest bidders and others caused by differences in
these variables should be obtained. Specific vari-
ables used in the analysis are described in Ta-
ble 1.7
Since there has been little previous work on pro-
test bid influences, it is difficult to form any a
priori hypotheses about the effect of individual
variables on respondent behavior. Based on previ-
ous efforts of Musser et al., and Smith and Des-
vousges, one might expect to find that those with
higher education and income levels are more likely
to register positive (nonprotest) bids; beyond this
rudimentary hypothesis, however, we could not
6 Press rmdWIlsorrnote that results of sample classification by dis-
criminant analysis and Iogitanalysis will notdiffer markedly, even when
the distribution of the explanatory variables is non-normal. The logit
analyses conducted in this study confirm this finding, However, since
diswiminant analysis was unable to effectively sort protest and nonpro-
test bidders, further research on tbe protest bid problem might use both
techniques in the interest of thoroughness.
7 The nature of the variables included suggested that a collinearity
problem might be encountered; however, no evidence of degrading col-
linearitywas found. In my case, the lowR*of the models used suggests
that my deletions in the variable set would notaffect explanatorypower.
NJARE
Table 1. Variables Included in Discriminant



















1 if respondent hunted, Ootherwise
1 if respondent belonged to an
environmental organization, Ootherwise
1 if respondent lives in a rural
neighborhood, Ootherwise
1 if respondent grew up in a rural
neighborhood, Ootherwise
Respondent’s age, in years
1if male, Oif female




Education level of responder 1 if some
college education or more, Oif high
school graduate or less
1 if respondent felt that as much wildlife
as possible should be preserved,
O otherwise
1 if respondent felt that society has more
important problems thmrpreserving
wildlife, Ootherwise
How often respondent makes
trips/vacations to see wildlife or natore
(1 = often, 4 = never)
1 if respondent reads books or watches
TV programs/movies about wildlife,
Ootherwise
1 if respondent regularly receives
publications on wildlife/environmental
issues, Ootherwise
Dollar amount of donations actually
made for wildlife management in past
year
1 if respondent is employed, Ootherwise
Wildlife attitude index
predict how protesters and non-protesters might
differ,
Results of the Discriminant Analysis
Results of the discriminant analysis are presented
in Table 2. Familiarity with the three species (tur-
keys, eagles, and coyotes), both through noncon-
sumptive activity (such as seeing or reading about
wildlife) and consumptive activity (hunting), con-
tributed strongly, albeit in different directions, to
the discriminant function. Hunters were more
likely to be protectors, as were those who were
members of a wildlife or environmental organiza-Halstead, Luloff, and Stevens Protest Bidders in Contingent Valuation 165
Table 2. Results of Discriminant Analysis:
Protest vs. Non-Protest Bidders in New



























Chiz for Lambda 30.35
Probability Level P< .02
tion, had taken more trips or vacations to see wild-
life or nature, and received a magazine on wildlife
or nature, while those whohadseen or read about
wildlife and had made contributions for wildlife
management were less likely to protest. In addi-
tion, protectors tended to be older, and had more
rural backgrounds and lower incomes than their
counterparts. The sign of the education variable
tended to confirm earlier work suggesting that
more educated respondents are less likely to pro-
test.
Despite these differences, the discriminant
model produced a very poor fit. This is indicated
by the low canonical correlation, which when
squared gives an indication of the amount of vari-




Classification of Cases Non-Protesters Protesters
Non-Protesters 207 (68%) 187 (90%) 20 (lo%)
Protesters 98 (32%) 71 (72%) 27 (28%)
Percent of “grouped” cases correctly classified: 70%
ation among the two groups accounted for by those
independent factors introduced, Less than 10% of
the total variation in protest bid behavior was ex-
plained in this model. This is also indicated by the
poor fit, as suggested by the high Wilks’ Lambda
and the relatively low X2.
Perhaps the best indication of the inability of
this model to adequately differentiate protectors
from non-protesters is drawn from the classifica-
tion table (Table 3), which suggests that 70% of
the respondents could be sorted into their appro-
priate groups. While on the surface such a sorting
is good, an inspection of the internal components
reveals that the discriminant function could cor-
rectly classify 90?Z0 of the non-protesters and only
28% of the protesters. Thus, the confusion matrix
reveals that the model is only moderately better
than what could be achieved on the basis of knowl-
edge of the margins alone; that is, if all the respon-
dents were sorted as non-protesters, 98 errors
would be made, while the discriminant function
resulted in 7 fewer errors (91).
Further analysis of the data set using a logit
model supported the results of the discriminant
Table 4. Logit Analysis of Factors
Influencing Protest and Non-Protest Bids









REAL$ –0.004 – 2.022*








EDUC –0.231 – 1.269
INCOME 0.192 1.410
WIJNDEX –0.093 –0.487
Chi-Squared: 27.289 with 17 d.f.
McFadden R2: .07
Percentage of right predictions: 69.2
Degrees of freedom 287
‘These respondents answered either “The bald eagle should be
preserved in New England but the money should come from
taxes and license fees instead of donations” or “Bald eagle
preservation is important to me but I refuse to place a dollar
value on it” to the survey question examining reasons for zero
bids.
*Significant at .05 level.166 October 1992 NJARE
Table 5. Actual Behavior of Protesters and Other Respondents
Respondents All
Attitudes (Non-Protesters) Protesters Ethical Vehicle
Actual donation to wildlife management last year (percent) 38 24 36 18
Average dollar amount actually donated to wildlife management last year 34.00 11.61 27.58 5.23
Average “gift” amount donated’ to wildlife management (dollars) 76 36 24 43
‘Respondents were asked to assumed that they had received a gift of $1,000.
analysis; that is, the model was unable to differ-
entiate between protest and non-protest bidders us-
ing the independent variables chosen (see Table
4).8 Only one variable @EAL$) was significant at
the 90% level; the significance and negative sign
of this variable indicate that people who actually
contribute to environmental organizations are less
likely to register protest bids. It is possible that
these respondents have less difficulty visualizing
the contingent market, since they may already be
donating money for preservation of endangered
species.
Protest Bidders: Additional Information
Since the discriminant analysis revealed little in
the way of differentiating protest bidders from
non-protest bidders, additional descriptive infor-
mation was drawn from the survey results in an
effort to shed more light on the issue. The survey
contained several questions and statements de-
signed to determine respondents’ attitudes about
the importance of preserving wildlife, such as:
How important is it to you that the bald eagle
exist in New England? (very important, some-
what important, not very important, not impor-
tant at all)
Society has much more important problems
than preserving wildlife. (strongly agree, mod-
erately agree, moderately disagree, strongly dis-
agree)
Protest zero bidders were slightly less likely
(47% vs. 58%) to view the existence of bald eagles
in New England as very important. Also, protest
zero bidders were more likely to feel that society
has more important problems than preserving wild-
life (45% vs. 30%). Thus, protest zero bidders feel
that bald eagle existence is important, but not as
important as other respondents seem to consider it.
If, as Dillman, and Stephens and Hall maintain,
8OtherIogitformulations wereconstructed usingsubsetsandcombi-
nations of variables; this approach yielded results that showed no sub-
stantial improvement over our discriminant analysis or the logit model
results in Table 4.
survey nonresponse is motivated by lack of interest
in the issue, the responses to this question cast
doubt on the practice of treating protest zero bid-
ders as nonrespondents (by dropping them from
the sample).
Actual behavior between protest zero bidders
and respondents offering positive bids also differed
(Table 5). Thirty-eight percent of respondents had
made actual contributions to environmental causes
in the previous year, compared to 249ioof the pro-
test zero bidders, On average, positive-bidding re-
spondents donated $34.00, compared to $11.61 for
protest zero bidders (this difference was statisti-
cally significant at the 570level). Ethical protesters
tended to donate considerably more than vehicle
protesters ($27.58 vs. $5.23), which is consistent
with the disagreement with the donation preserva-
tion vehicle implied in response (b).
When allocating a hypothetical “gift” of
$1,000,9 positive-bidding respondents tended to
give more than protest zero bidders ($76 vs. $36).
When considering the two subgroups of protesters,
those with vehicle concerns tended to offer more
than ethical protesters ($43 vs. $24); this contrasts
with actual behavior, where ethical protesters gave
more than vehicle protesters.
While it is difficult to draw firm conclusions
from this type of qualitative analysis, it appears
that
l Both respondents offering positive bids and
protest zero bidders value the resource, but
positive bidders tend to value it more;
l Ethical protesters tend to offer less ‘‘hypothet-
ical” cash to protect natural resources, but
give more in actual dollars than vehicle pro-
testers.
The empirical consequences of eliminating pro-
test zero bids from the data are shown in Table 6.
As expected, the average bids and the median bid
derived from the dichotomous-choice format both
9 The followin8question was asked in the survey: “Suppose that you
received a $1,000 gift. Considering your existing financial obligations,
how much of it, if any, would you contribute toward wildlife manage-
ment in New England?”Halstead, Luloff, and Stevens Protest Bidders in Contingent Valuation 167
Table 6. Average Bids and Equivalent
Surplus Estimates, Dollars per
Person per Year
Protest Zero Protest Zero
Bids Included Bids Excluded
Model Mean Median Mean Median
Dichotomous-Choice
logit (log




Average bld 9.80 14.46
“Natural log of offer amount and income.
bMedianis negative (see Bowker and Stoll).
increased (by 4990 and 29%, respectively). How-
ever, the mean willingness to pay estimate ob-
tained from the logarithmic specification of the di-
chotomous-choice model declined by about 23T0,
while the mean willingness to pay estimate for the
linear specification increased. Elimination of zero
protest bids shifted the estimated probability func-
tions, as shown in Figure 1. All models “fit” the
data equally well, but the consequences of elimi-
nating protest zero bids in dichotomous choice dif-
fer considerably with functional form and whether
the mean or median is used to estimate economic
value (other authors have noted this problem; a
more general discussion of effect of functional
form on surplus measures is provided in Boyle). 10
This suggests that particular caution is necessary
whenever dichotomous-choice data might contain
a significant number of protest zero bids. In any
event, the decision to include, modify, or exclude
protest zero bids obviously has a very significant
impact on aggregate value estimates for the exam-
ple presented here.
Conclusions
This article attempted to differentiate between pro-
test and non-protest bidders in a CVM study of
wildlife based on respondents’ sociodemographic
characteristics. Discriminant analysis was not able
to conclusively distinguish between these two
groups. Effectively, therefore, we could not reject
the hypothesis that protest and non-protest bidders
are the same sociodemographically. Using more
qualitative data from the survey, it appeared that
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Offeramount(doltars)
— Legform with proteotzerobida included
------- Log form with protest zero bids excluded
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. . . . . .,. Linear form wfth protast sero bids included
Figure 1. Estimated Willingness to Pay Prob-
ability Function
protest bidders did indeed value the resource-that
is, they were not registering “legitimate” zero
bids-but at a lower value than actual (non-zero-
bidding) respondents.
Our principal concern is that protest bidders may
not be very different from other survey respon-
dents, except in terms of their willingness to pay.
Consider, for example, the respondents who pro-
tested the CVM described in this study: 24?Z0 of the
protesters had actually donated money for wildlife
preservation during the previous year. This implies
that many (if not most) of the zero bids did not
represent”actual zero valuations. It also suggests
that the behavior of protest bidders with regard to
monetary commitment may differ from that of
other respondents, even though there may be little,
if any, sociodemographic differences between pro-
testers and non-protesters. Better information
about why individuals refuse to pay is obviously
needed.
In practice, protest bids are often excluded dur-
ing analysis of CVM data. We suggest, however,
that this procedure might itiroduce significant
bias, that the direction of bias cannot be deter-
mined a priori, and that the bias also depends on
estimation techniques and functional form. The
question then is, how should the partial informa-
tion contained in responses by those who protest be
used? As previously noted, there are three primary
methods of addressing the protest bid problem.
The potential effect on resource valuation of each
method, given our tentative findings, is as follows:
Method 1: Identify the protest bids and dis-
card them from the sample. This effectively
treats protesters as having mean WTP values;168 October 1992 NJARE
our results suggest that protesters may value the
resource less than positive bidders, so that ag-
gregate valuation estimates would be biased up-
wards.
Method 2: Include the protest zero bids as
true zero bids. Since few, if any, of our protest
bids represent true zero valuation of the resource
(only 6% of zero bidders said that the wildlife
species examined in the study were worth noth-
ing to them), this would bias value estimates
downwards.
Method 3: Treat protest zeros as “missing
variables” and adjust using econometric tech-
niques to obtain WTP estimates. Since the R2 for
this model (and models from similar studies) is
very low, and discriminant analysis was unable
to identify differences between positive bidders
and protesters using the independent variables
chosen, this method would probably generate
WTP estimates close to the positive bid respon-
dents’ mean, thus duplicating the bias of method
1 above. This method could hold promise if
more could be learned about protest bidders’
motivation; however, to date, little is known
about the theoretical relationship between indi-
vidual sociodemographic characteristics and
WTP.
We therefore recommend that, in general, CVM
researchers should generally not automatically jet-
tison protest responses. Under conditions of either
a high overall survey response rate or a low protest
rate (or both), the practice of eliminating protest
zeros may not, however, introduce ‘‘unaccept-
able” bias. Perhaps, in the absence of more com-
plete knowledge of protest bidders’ true WTP, the
researcher’s best alternative is to present a range of
WTP estimates. A lower-bound estimate would be
generated by treating the protest bids as legitimate
zeros. To derive an upper bound, protest bidders
could be assigned the sample mean, or new WTP
estimates for the zero bidders could be generated
by using method 3.
The results presented here are for one case
study, using one particular valuation technique.
While one case study cannot be used as an argu-
ment to reshape thinking on CVM, it does indicate
that further research on the issue of protest bidders
is needed. In particular, the hypothesis that the
characteristics which personify protest bidders will
vary by the type of valuation problem being stud-
ied—that is, whether one is measuring existence,
option, or consumptive-use value, and in what set-
ting (e.g., wildlife, open space valuation)+ould
be examined. One weakness of the present study
was that it was not initially designed to examine
protest behavior; future studies should be con-
ducted with protest behavior as their primary aim,
with questions specifically targeted at identifying
these respondents and their motivation. Finally,
the typically low R2 values obtained in economet-
ric models indicate that many factors influencing
WTP are not being captured by survey data; it is
quite possible that the personal “differences” that
motivate protest bidders were simply not included
in our analysis.
Contingent valuation (and other) researchers
have exhaustively examined the issues of inter-
viewer bias, starting-point bias, vehicle bias, hy-
pothetical bias, and various other problems in sur-
vey work. Perhaps it is time to devote more atten-
tion to the protest bid problem.
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